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Securities Arbitration Appeal: An
Oxymoron No Longer?
By C. EvAN STEWART*
INTRODUCTION
Appealing a tribunal's decision has been likened to putting
"the dice into the box for another throw."' Although this notion
conjures up a subjective image of the process, the right of appeal
has been for centuries an essential element in ensuring the fairness
of our civil litigation system. 2
That system has been under an increasingly comprehensive
attack by critics, who argue that it is too cumbersome, burdensome,
time consuming, formalistic, and expensive.3 Many of those same
critics aggressively promote the arbitration process in its place,
hailing arbitration as having none of the aforementioned problems,
while having many virtues. 4 Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
* General Counsel, The Nikko Securities Co. International, Inc. B.A. 1974, J.D.
1977, Cornell Umversity.
I A. BmRcE, THE Dvm's DicTIoNAY 17 (1942). Justice Frankfurter put it a bit
differently, characterizing the appellate process as a place where "[d]isappointed litigants
and losing lawyers like to have another go at it." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
352 U.S. 521, 524 (1957). Previously, and in a jocular vein, he wrote about the alternative
to the appellate process: "a practice familiar in the long history of Anglo-American
litigation, whereby unsuccessful litigants and lawyers give vent to their disappointment in
tavern or press." United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
2 Although the U.S. federal circuit courts were established by the first Judiciary Act
of September 24, 1784, the right to appeal a trial court verdict is a long established tradition
in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
3 See, e.g., Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1808
(1986); Edward, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARv. L. Ray.
668 (1986); see generally S. GOLDBERO, E. GREEN & F SANDER, DIsPuTE RE soLUTION (1985)
[hereinafter GOBERG]. Courts also are critical of the system. See Securities Indus. Ass'n
v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990)
(swollen judicial system defined as being in a state of hypertrophy-"the pathologic 'over-
growth of an organ or part resulting from unusually steady to severe use.
(citation omitted)).
4 See, e.g., Edelman, Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JusT. Sys.
J. 134 (1984); Faure, The Arbitration Alternative: Its Time Has Come, 46 MoNT. L. Rv.
199 (1985); Katsons, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FoRDHAm URBAN L.J. 361
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upholding the arbitrability of claims under Section 10(b) (and Rule
lOb-5 promulgated thereunder) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 19345 and Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 19336 have
provided a great deal of momentum for the shifting of a multitude
of civil disputes into the forum of arbitration.
7
(1988). The virtues trumpeted include the following: (i) disputes are resolved swiftly, infor-
mally and inexpensively, (ii) arbitrators are not bound to follow statutes, regulations or
case law, (iii) the process provides finality, since there is virtually no right of appeal, and
(iv) oftentimes specific industry arbitrations draw upon industry experts to sit as arbitrators,
thereby ensunng that complicated claims will be understood and resolved easily. See 5 A.
SOMNER, SEcuarrnis LAw TECHNQU s § 118.0111] (1987); see also 1 ARisTomTE, THE
RaET ORIc oF AusTonTE ch. 13, 77-78 (1932) ("It is equitable to agree to arbitration
[rather] than to go to court-for the umpire in an arbitration looks to equity, whereas the
juryman sees only the law. Indeed, arbitration was devised to the end that equity might
have full sway.").
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
Rodnguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., - U.S. -, 109 S.
Ct. 1917 (1989).
7 See Cain, Commercial Dispute and Compulsory Arbitration, 44 Bus. LAW. 65
(1988). Prior to McMahon and Rodriguez, the Court laid the groundwork to overturn
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas, - U.S. -,
109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) (rejecting the arbitrability of claims under Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933) and embraced the strong policy favoring arbitration set forth in the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) [hereinafter FAA]. See Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985) ("[W]e are well past
the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of
arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution."); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) ("[P]assage of
the [FAA] was motivated first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements
into which parties had entered, and we must not overlook this principal objective when
construing the statute. " (footnote omitted)); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
14 (1984) ("To confine the scope of the [FAA] to arbitrations sought to be enforced in
federal courts could frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a broad enact-
ment. "); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
("[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration."); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S: 506, 519 (1974) quoting
The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) ("The invalidation of [an
arbitration agreement] would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn promise
but would, as well, reflect a 'parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts."').
Since McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas there has been a tremendous amount of
litigation in which securities firms have consistently moved to compel investors to seek
redress only before industry arbitration panels. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Georgiadis, 724 F Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Russo v. Simmons, 723 F
Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Rubashkin v. Philips, Appel and Waldren Inc., 722 F Supp.
1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The securities industry's intense desire to litigate exclusively before
arbitration panels is perhaps best illustrated by its response to Massachusetts' attempt to
bar arbitration agreements between firms and customers: the industry trade association went
to court and had the state's regulations ruled void because they conflicted with, and were
thus preempted by, the FAA. See Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114.
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This article does not attempt to evaluate or comment on the
relative merits of this trend." Rather, it examines what would seem
to be a logical outgrowth of it. With the arbitration process coming
to be relied upon more and more, it is in fact becoming more like
the civil litigation system it was 'designed to replace. 9
I For an examination of the author's view of this trend see Stewart, Dissenting Voice
on Securities Arbitration, LEGAL Tims, Aug. 21, 1989, at 23. The author is not the only
one who prefers the civil litigation system to arbitration. "Adjudication is more likely to
do justice than conversation, mediation, arbitration, settlement, rent-a-judge, mini-tnals,
community moots or any other contrivance of [Alternative Dispute Resolution], precisely
because it vests the power of the state in officials who act as trustees for the public, who
are highly visible, and who are committed to reason. What we need at the moment is not
another assault on this form of public power, but a renewed appreciation of all that
it promises." Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985); see also Stroh Container
Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1141 (1986) ("Parties resorting to arbitration m commercial situations are finding not only
that the arbitration process is complex, expensive and time consuming, but the results of
arbitration by private and untrained 'judges' are distantly remote from the fair process
procedurally followed and application of prmcipled law found m the judicial process.").
9 Arbitration now resembles the civil litigation system it was designed to replace. In
the securities industry context, for example, many of the trappings of the civil litigation
system now exist: (i) formal discovery procedures (including depositions), with sanctioning
power given to arbitrators to enforce compliance with discovery obligations (e.g., New York
Stock Exchange Rules [hereinafter NYSE Rules] § 619(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2619,
at 4318 (Feb. 1989), (ii) pre-arbitration conferences to resolve discovery disputes and other
procedural and evidentiary questions (e.g., NYSE Rules § 619(d), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2619, at 4319 (May 1989)), (iii) greater utilization of the rules and procedures (evidentiary
and otherwise) that exist in the civil litigation system (e.g., id.), (iv) the consolidation of
individual cases into one arbitration (not unlike the class action procedure-indeed, there
is already great pressure building up to permit class actions in arbitrations (see infra note
53 and accompanying text)), (v) complete transcriptions made of the hearings (e.g., NYSE
Rules § 623, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2623, at 4320 (May 1989)), (vi) written arbitration
awards that are published (e.g., NYSE Rules § 627, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2627, at
4321 (May 1989)), and (vii) increasing restrictions on industry-"tainted" individuals from
serving on arbitration panels-thus having the process more closely resemble the civil jury
system (e.g., NYSE Rules §§ 607, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2607, at 4313 (Nov. 1989),
608, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2608, at 4314 (Nov. 1989) & 610, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2610, at 4315 (Nov. 1989)). These changes significantly negate-if not eliminate-the
advantages of arbitration. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
The McMahon Court's ruling was in large measure based upon the Securities and
Exchange Commission's amicus curiae brief, in which the SEC argued that its oversight
jurisdiction over the self-regulatory organizations' arbitration procedures was strong enough
to ensure that the arbitration process would be fair to all who brought claims against the
members of that industry. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233. On May 10, 1989, the SEC, making
good on its pledge, approved the above noted wholesale changes in the arbitration process.
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,414 (May 10, 1989) [hereinafter Release No. 26,805]. Notwithstanding
these changes, many small investors continue to believe that arbitrations under the junsdic-
tion of the self-regulatory organizations are heavily weighted in favor of the securities
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Part I of this Article examines the statutory bases for judicial
review of arbitration claims.10 Part II explores the common law
development of the "manifest disregard" standard of review 11 Part
III then examines three reasons for active judicial review of secu-
rities arbitration decisions. 12
I. THE STATUTORY BASES FOR SEEKING JUDICIAL REviEw
Once an arbitration panel makes an award, the successful party
must confirm the award by seeking and obtaimng a judicial order. 3
Under federal law, the appropriate court will grant the order unless
there are grounds for vacation, modification or correction of the
award. 14
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that an
award may be vacated for the following reasons: (a) the award
was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means, (b) the arbi-
tration panel was partial or corrupt, (c) the arbitration panel was
guilty of misconduct, thereby prejudicing the rights of any party,
or (d) the arbitration panel exceeded its powers, or so imperfectly
industry. See 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1805-06 (Dec. 8, 1989); Hennquez, When
Naivete Meets Wall Street, N.Y. Times, December 3, 1989, § 3 (Busmess), at 1; N.Y. Times,
December 21, 1989, § D (Business), at 8. For that reason, the SEC urged the securities
industry to adopt a uniform rule mandating that securities firms provide customers with
the right to use non-industry arbitration forums. See 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 817-
18 (June 1, 1990).
1o See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 40-100 and accompanying text.
13 The federal process for confirmation is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 1-14 (1982); the process under New York law (N.Y. Crv PAc. L. & R. § 7510
(McKinney 1989)) is substantially similar. The party seeking confirmation in federal court
has up to one year to file, although a court may waive the one year requirement. See
Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 120 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
887 (1953). The one year requirement in New York, however, is not discretionary and acts
as a mandatory statute of limitations. See Elliott v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d
419 (N.Y. 1983).
Alternatively, a party seeking to vacate an award has up to three months after the
filing or delivery of the award to file an appropriate motion in court. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
New York also has the three month period. N.Y. Civ PRAc. L. & R. § 7511(a) (McKinney
1989). The only difference between the application of these laws is that New York permits
a party to oppose a motion to confirm with a motion to vacate after the three months have
passed; federal law does not allow that practice. Compare Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Ins
Constr. Corp., 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (N.Y. 1960) with Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d
171 (2d Cir. 1984).
" 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982); see Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1987);
Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 1986).
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executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.'5
Section 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that an
award may be modified or corrected for these reasons: (a) there
was a material miscalculation of figures or a material nustake in
the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the
award, (b) an award was made on a matter not submitted to
arbitration, or (c) an award is imperfect in a matter of form that
does not affect the merits of the controversy 16
Courts traditionally have interpreted these statutory provisions
narrowly, to limit judicial review of arbitration awards. 17 And until
thirty years ago these provisions were thought to provide the only
basis for an appeal.
II. TAE EMERGENCE OF THE "MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE
LAW" DOCTRINE
In Wilko v Swan,'1 the Supreme Court first suggested a judi-
cially created standard of judicial review called "manifest disregard
of the law " Although it rejected the arbitrability of claims under
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,19 the Court. recognized
in dictum that,
Is 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). New York law allows vacation under similar circumstances.
See N.Y. Civ. PR c. L. & R. § 7511(b)(1) (McKinney 1989).
'- 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982). Again, New York law provides virtually identical grounds
for modification. See N.Y. Crv PRAc. L. & R. § 7511(c) (McKinney 1989).
'7 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygrapic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956); Saxis S.S.
Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1976).
11 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amencan
Express, Inc., U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
"1 The Court's rejection of the arbitration process as a proper forum to resolve disputes
under the securities laws was based upon four perceived problems: (i) the arbitration process
seemed at odds with established case law requiring "subjective findings on the purpose and
knowledge of an alleged [securities laws] violator," (ii) the Court believed that non-judicial
arbitrators would make errors when confronted with the complexity of the securities laws,
(iii) the Court feared that there would be awards that were unfair and inconsistent with the
law because there were no requirements of published opimons or complete records of
proceedings, and (iv) the difficulty of meeting the standards of sections 10 and 11 of the
FAA meant that the other problems could not be remedied on appeal or through judicial
review. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36. Although Justice Blackmun in his dissent in McMahon
wrote at length that these problems had not gone away since Wilko, see Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 258-59 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), his
views by that time were in the mnnority. See also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amiencan
Express, Inc., U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1923 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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[w]hile it may be true that a failure of the arbitrators to
decide in accordance with [applicable law] would 'constitute
grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the
Federal Arbitration Act,' that failure would need to be made
clearly to appear. [T]he interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation. 20
Lower courts were slow to adopt the "manifest disregard" stan-
dard; the few that did interpreted the language to mean that,
although an arbitrator's interpretation of the law was not review-
able, an arbitrator's conscious disregard of the law was.21 That
standard, as interpreted, imtially may have seemed workable. It
did little to assist the losing parties in arbitration, however, because
there were few if any tangible ways to demonstrate manifest dis-
regard of the law 22
As the arbitration process has become more widely utilized over
the past decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken the lead in
stressing that arbitrators must look to and follow the law 23 This
- Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (footnote omitted). In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter
wrote, "Arbitrators may not disregard the law. On this we are all agreed." Id. at 440
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
21 See, e.g., Office of Supply, Gov't of Republic of South Korea v. New York
Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1972); San Martine Compama de Navegacion
v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961) (manifest disregard standard
met "when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the
same"). One commentator has designated this an "extreme view" of the "manifest disre-
gard" standard. H. BLOOMENTri, SEcuRriFs LAW HANDBOOK § 25.12[71 (1989). Subse-
quent courts, see infra notes 24, 25, 31-38 and accompanying text, and the SEC have taken
a somewhat more flexible view of the "manifest disregard" standard: "The error must have
been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person
qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly govermng legal principle but decides to pay no attention
to it." Release No. 26,805, supra note 9, at 80,109 n.45 (citations omitted).
2 As noted by one commentator,
courts will not vacate an arbitral award for mistakes of law made by the
arbitrators unless, as a general rule, there is some indication that the arbitrators
knew what the applicable law was and simply ignored it or refused to apply
it. Because arbitrators are not required to give reasons for their decisions
some commentators question how a dissatisfied arbitrant can challenge the
award on the basis of a manifest disregard of the law.
-Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agree-
ments, 71 MiNN. L. REv 393, 456-57 (1981) (footndtes omitted).
As the Supreme Court moved toward overturning Wilko, see supra note 7, it also
made clear that arbitrators were responsible for applying applicable law. In Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), for example, the
Court ruled that an agreement to arbitrate disputes under U.S. antitrust laws required even
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requirement appears to have had at least two effects on the "man-
ifest disregard of the law" standard. First, more courts now em-
brace it and openly look for ways in which to review arbitration
awards that appear to be clearly contrary to law 2 Indeed, in the
courts of the Southern'District of New York, which have junsdic-
tion over the nation's busiest commercial center, such reivew is
becoming relatively routine.2 Second, courts are beginmng to ac-
knowledge other non-statutory bases for reviewing arbitration
awards on the grounds of irrationality, 26 public policy,27 ambiguity
or indefiniteness,2 arbitrariness or capriciousness, 29 and lack of
a foreign arbitration panel to apply the appropnate law. The Court stressed that "the
national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award enforcement
stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been
addressed." Id. at 638. Subsequently, in McMahon, the majority wrote, "we have indicated
that there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law;
although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is suffi-
cient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute." McMahon,
482 U.S. at 232 (citations omitted).
11 Courts in at least six circuits have utilized the "manifest disregard" standard. See,
e.g., 0. R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assoc., 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986); Stroh
Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1141 (1986); San Martine Compania de Navagacion, 293 F.2d at 796; Bechtel Constructors
Corp. v. Detroit Carpenters Dist. Council, 610 F Supp. 1550 (E.D. Mich. 1985). Circuits
that have rejected this standard are the Seventh in Mosely, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Wesden,
Inc. v. Ellis, 899 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1988), and the Tenth in Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
2 See, e.g., In re Southwind Shipping Co., S.A., 709 F Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Concourse Beauty School, Inc. v. Polakov, 685 F Supp. 1311 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Fried,
Krupp, GmbH v. Solidarity Carners, Inc., 674 F Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y..1987), aff'd, 838
F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1988); Svoboda v. Negey Associates, Inc., 655 F Supp. 1329 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Sea Dragon, Inc. v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaast-Kantoor B.V., 574 F Supp. *367
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). Simultaneously, courts in the southern district of New York have made
clear that frivolous challenges to arbitration awards will not be dealt with lightly. See Quick
& Reilly Inc. v. Jacobson, 126 F.R.D. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (sanctions imposed for appeal
of award that was not subject to valid legal challenge).
16 See, e.g., French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902,
906 (9th Cir. 1986); Industrial Mut. Ass'n v. Amalgamated Workers, 725 F.2d 406, 412
(6th Cir. 1984); McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. Gross, 699 F Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1988),
aff'd, 862 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1988); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Caporale, 664 F Supp.
72 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 674 F Supp. 920
(D.D.C. 1987).
" See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d
81, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Diapulse Corp. of Amenca v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110
(2d Cir. 1980).
28 See, e.g., Americas Ins. Co. v. Seagull Compama Naviera, S.A., 774 F.2d 64 (2d
Cir. 1985); Sargent, 674 F Supp. at 920.
29 See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d
775 (11th Cir. 1988); Local 657 Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 735
F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1984).
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factual support. 30
Notwithstanding this trend, a recent decision by the Second
Circuit, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Bobker,31
illustrates the great difficulty courts have had in reviewing arbitra-
tion awards and applying the "manifest disregard" standard. In
Bobker, a company in which the arbitration claimant (Bobker)
owned stock made a self-tender for more than a majority of its
outstanding shares. Just after instructing his brokerage firm (Mer-
rill Lynch) to tender all of his stock (4,000 shares), Bobker directed
the firm to sell 2,000 shares short at the then market price and to
buy an equal amount back after the tender was completed, at a
lower price per share. The firm did so, but then voided the short
sale two days later, prior to the tender's completion.
Bobker subsequently brought an arbitration claim against Mer-
rill Lynch, seeking money damages equal to the amount of profits
he would have gained if the short sale had gone through. Merrill
Lynch defended on the ground that allowing the sale would have
violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-4, promulgated thereunder by the SEC.32 There was ex-
tensive briefing, testimony, and argument at the arbitration about
the appropriateness and proper application of Rule 10b-4,33 which
ultimately left one arbitrator shaking his head about this compli-
cated area of the law 34
See, e.g., Pubic Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Local 111 Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
709 F Supp. 212 (D. Colo. 1989); Clemons v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 708 F Supp.
62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
3, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
31 Rule 10b-4 provides in relevant part that,
It shall constitute a 'manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance' and a
'fraudulent, deceptive, or mampulative act or practice' as those terms are used
in sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Act, respectively, for any person to
tender any subject security in a partial offer: (1) For his own account unless
at the time of tender, and at the end of the proration period or period during
which securities are accepted by lot (including any extensions thereof), he
owns: (i) The subject security or (ii) [ain equivalent security. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1990).
Rule 1Ob-4 also provides that "a person shall be deemed to own a security for the purposes
of [Rule lOb-4] only to the extent that he has a net long position in such security." Id.
3 Bobker, 808 F.2d at 932-33.
34 The arbitrator's questions and comments are quoted at length throughout the
Second Circuit's opinion. His remarks at the conclusion of the heanng were, "we now
hopefully have to come up with the right answer on this law, and it is a very gray area. I
think this is just going to be a deliberation we are going to have to go through." Id. at
933. He is later quoted as saying, "I read that law and I cannot interpret it. 1" Id. at
937. The arbitrator's confusion mirrors Justice Jackson's famous comment: "I give up.
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On the final day of the hearing, the arbitration panel awarded
Bobker one half of his lost profits damages, without a written
decision. Two months later, Merrill Lynch filed a petition in the
Southern Distnct of New York to vacate the award. Judge Wein-
feld, upon briefing by the parties and the SEC-whose brief sup-
ported Merrill Lynch's position, 35 vacated the award, ruling that
as a matter of law the short sale would have violated Rule lOb-4
and that the panel had acted in manifest disregard of the law.3 6
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
decision. Although the appellate court acknowledged that "[a]t
first blush" Judge Weinfeld seemed correct that there has been
"manifest disregard of the law," ' 37 it concluded that the standard
for reversing the award had not been met:
The sole issue before us is whether the arbitrators, in not stnctly
enforcing the "net long" provision, acted in "manifest disregard
of the law " We cannot agree that they did. On the contrary,
their long colloquy with counsel, after being informed of the
provisions of Rule lOb-4, reveals that as a result of careful and
conscientious analysis they had serious doubts about the ration-
ality and interpretation of the "net long" proviso and how it
serves the Rule's avowed purpose of preventing a stockholder
such as Bobker from increasing his pro rata share of stock
tendered and accepted over the pro rata share of that tendered
by other stockholders.38
In its decision, the court reaffirmed the view that, where the
govermng legal pnnciple is complex and arguably subject to varying
interpretations, an arbitration award may not be vacated so long
as it can be demonstrated that the arbitrators did not avoid coming
to grips with that legal principle, but rather attempted to apply
it-even if demonstrably incorrectly 39
Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the
more I don't understand it."' SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947).
11 Bobker, 808 F.2d at 934.
-Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 636 F Supp. 444, 447-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). ("Permitting this award to stand would have the unacceptable result of
penalizing Merrill Lynch for acting in accordance with the law.").
Bobker, 808 F.2d at 935.
" Id. at 936-37. The court also ruled that the arbitrators' "arbitrarily" splitting of
Bobker's lost profits damage claim was not further evidence of "manifest disregard of the
law." Id. at 937.
39 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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III. SHOULD THERE BE AN EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 9
In his Wilko dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that, commen-
surate with the arbitration of complex securities law claims, the
courts would be able to devise "appropriate means for judicial
scrutiny in the form of some record or opinion, however
informal, whereby compliance will appear, or want of it will upset
the award. "40 Today, with the sweeping procedural changes af-
fecting the arbitration process in the securities industry, 41 such
records and opinions are now being created. 42 Nevertheless, and
notwithstanding the aforementioned willingness of some courts to
review arbitration awards on certain grounds, 43 there does not exist
an appellate review process in any way comparable to that in the
civil litigation system;" the Bobker decision makes that evident.
45
For at least three reasons, arbitrants need a broadened right of
appeal-at minmum, one in which an arbitrator's interpretation
of govermng law is reviewable.
A. The Protection of Complex Substantive Rights
In Shearson/American Express v McMahon,46 besides ruling
that fraud claims under Rule lOb-5 are arbitrable, the Supreme
40 Wilkd v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 440 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Selected Summary Award State-
ments, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 995-1003 (July 7, 1989) (first publication of New
York Stock Exchange arbitration awards); "Summaries of National Association of Securities
Dealers Arbitration Awards", 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1252-55 (August 11, 1989)
(first publication of National Association of Securities Dealers arbitration awards).
42 Even though it has been urged to do so by several groups, to date the SEC has not
mandated that written decisions be included as part of the award process. See Release No.
26,805, supra note 9, at 80,109. However, the Commission has taken the position that,
"It]he data already included in the awards under this proposal together with the pleadings
and the verbatim record of the case ought to be sufficient in making determinations under
the current manifest disregard standard." Id. at n.45. Notwithstanding the SEC's position,
it has been reported that securities industry groups are planmng to change arbitration
procedures to encourage the issuance of written findings of fact and conclusions of law in
large and complex cases; such changes, as currently contemplated, would not require SEC
approval. See Rules Changed to Make Written Findings Easier to Obtain in Larger Arbi-
trations, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 816-17 (June 1, 1990).
4 See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 21 & 22, 31-38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 8. As
the Chairman of the NASD's arbitration review panel noted, the nature of the current
arbitration process, which hinders appeils, "is somewhat contrary to the American notion
of justice." Hennques, supra note. 9, at 6.
41 See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
- 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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Court also addressed the arbitrability of a claim brought under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 47
Notwithstanding the complexity of the statute whose "extraordi-
nary" breadth it had explicitly cnticized,48 the Court held that
RICO claims are arbitrable. 49 Besides RICO, claims under virtually
all federal statutes, including the antitrust laws5° and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),51 are now arbitrable.5 2
Additionally, strong pressures are being exerted to have class ac-
tions handled by arbitrators.5 3 The true teaching of McMahon and
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1990).
- Courts have tremendous difficulty interpreting various RICO provisions. See Se-
dima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985); Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern:"
The Search For "Continuity Plus Relationship", 73 Cop.NEL L. REv 971 (1988) (detailing
at length the difficulties lower courts have had in interpreting the RICO statute).
4" The Court, finding no legislative history evidencing congressional intent to bar the
arbitration of RICO claims, rejected the claimants' arguments that (i) arbitration was
irreconcilably at odds with the underlying purposes of RICO, (ii) the overlap between civil
and crimnal RICO provisions rendered the civil claim nonarbitrable, and (iii) public interest
in RICO enforcement bars arbitration of the civil claim because the treble damage deterrent
was abolished. The Court noted that it analyzed and rejected each of these arguments in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-37 (1985),
where the arbitrability of antitrust claims arising out of international transactions was at
issue. Shearson/Amencan Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
"' Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614. But see American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P Maguire
& Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968) (domestic antitrust disputes are "inappropriate for
arbitration"), criticized in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632-36. Lower courts now have extended
Mitsubishi to domestic antitrust cases. See GKG Caribe, Inc. v. Nokia-Mobira, Inc., 725
F Supp. 109 (1989).
51 Annulfo P Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1988);
Rosenblum v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, 700 F Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1987). Although the
Second Circuit held that ERISA claims are not arbitrable, the Supreme Court recently
vacated and remanded that decision in light of its decision in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989). Shearson Lehman/Amencan
Express, Inc. v. Bird, 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1989), vacated, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989).
12 Prior to McMahon, the Supreme Court held that employee claims under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were not arbitrable. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1973). But see Roe v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., No. 88 Civ. 8507 (S.D.N.Y.
April 19, 1990) (Court granted employer a stay of Title VII judicial proceedings pending
arbitration pursuant to prior agreement). Notwithstanding the important issues at stake
under Title VII, the Alexander decision makes little sense in light of McMahon and
Rodriguez. Moreover, virtually all other employee-employer disputes may be arbitrated.
See, e.g., NYSE Rule 347, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2347, at 3596 (Oct. 1989) (arbitration
between registered representatives and member firms mandated with respect to any employ-
ment controversies); see also Fleck v. E. F Hutton Group, Inc., 891 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir.
1989) (broker's post employment tort dispute held arbitrable under NYSE Rule 347); Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990) (age discrimnation claims
held arbitrable).
11 A subcommittee of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) rec-
ommended that the self regulatory organizations propose rule changes that would have class
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Rodriguez thus seems to be that any legal right created by Congress
can and should be adjudicated before an arbitrator or arbitration
panel.
While this approach may be attractive, should not there be
some way to ensure that arbitrators get it right? As Oliver Wendell
Holmes once opined, individuals and institutions have a right to
understand what is acceptable conduct (commercial or otherwise),
and to be sure that such conduct will be protected.5 4 Yet, under
the current standard of review, with complex federal statutes being
argued before arbitration panels,-' there is no way to guarantee
that parties' substantive rights will be fairly heard and properly
adjudged.56 Equally disturbing is the fact that, while the number
actions directed first to the courts, which would resolve issues concerning representation
and certification, and-then send the cases back to arbitration; the SEC staff is studying
that proposal and is seeking a uniform industry position. See SEC Approves Arbitration
Summaries, Other Rewsions to Industry Programs, 21 Sec. Rep. & L. Rep. (BNA) 683
(May 12, 1989) [hereinafter SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries]. For a view of how
courts have thus far addressed this matter, see Keating v. Supenor Court, 645 P.2d 1192
(Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I
(1984). See also Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1986) (petition to
compel arbitration in class action against broker discussed); Izzy v. Mesquite Country Club,
231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1986) (case remanded for determination of whether class action arbi-
tration could proceed). For a view of how commentators have thus far addressed this
matter, see H. BLOOMENTEAL, supra note 21, at § 25.1215]; Note, Classwide Arbitration
and lob-5 Claims in the Wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74
CoiRNa L. Rnv. 380 (1989).
According to at least one case, Champ v. Siegal Trading Co., No. 89 Civ. 7148 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 2, 1990), the trend is toward requiring an express provision in an arbitration
agreement before allowing consolidation of claims. By analogy, the court held that class
certification must be demed absent express provisions in an arbitration agreement. Id.
11 Holmes wrote:
"[Amny legal standard must be one which would apply to all men
under the same circumstances. It is not intended that the public force should
fall upon an individual accidentally, or at the whim of any body of men. The
standard must be fixed.
Finally, any legal standard must be capable of being known. When a
man has to pay damages, he is supposed to have broken the law, and he is
further supposed to have known what the law was."
0. HoLMES, THE COMMON LAw 110-11 (1881).
s It is not Just federal statutes that are argued in arbitrations. Different state statutes
are often in dispute; similarly, and as recently noted by the SEC, "legal issues are often
dispositive in employment cases between broker-dealers and registered representatives, and
these issues differ from state to state." Release No. 26,805, supra note 9, at 80,109.
m The history of the Bobker arbitration clearly demonstrates that there is no such
guarantee. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 8. Furthermore,
there are no procedural methods for the hearing of dispositive legal issues in the arbitration
process. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
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of arbitrations has increased exponentially, the number of arbitra-
tors has decreased, and those who act as arbitrators are often
poorly qualified and/or trained. 57
The SEC acknowledges this problem. When it approved the
sweeping procedural changes for arbitrations conducted by the self-
regulatory organizations, the Commission noted that "[i]t may be
appropriate to provide for written opimons for [large and complex]
cases. ' 58 Although it is not hard to identify significant disadvan-
tages to having laymen write legal decisions on complicated secu-
rities issues, 59 this acknowledgement clearly envisions greater judicial
17 The number of new securities arbitrations before self-regulatory organizations went
from 830 in 1980 to 6,101 m 1988. Masucci & Moms, Arbitration at the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange, SEcURrrTms ARBiTRATiON
1989 437, 442 (P.L.I. 1989). The number of securities arbitrations before the American
Arbitration Association went from 119 m 1986 to 495 in 1988, with the money damages
claimed correspondingly rising from $15 million in 1986 to $266 million in 1989. Friedman,
Securities: The Latest Developments, N.Y. L.J. Mar. 9, 1989 at 3, 4; see also infra note 92
(increasing punitive damage awards).
Simultaneously, new procedures approved by the SEC have limited the number of
industry-"tainted" individuals who can serve on arbitration panels. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text. Tins has resulted in the Director of Arbitration for the N.A.S.D.
-publicly announcing that there are fewer available arbitrators. Henriques, supra note 9, at
6. Finally, the training and qualifications of arbitrators have been an articulated concern
of the SEC for years. See September 10, 1987 letter from the SEC's Director of Market
Regulation to the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (there is "virtually no
formal traimng for arbitrators on matters relating to either arbitration law, relevant state
law or securities law."), reprinted in J. ScHRopp, SEcuiUnms ARBmTRATiON, Naw AP-
PROACHMS TO SEcuRrrms COUNSELNG & LrnIATION AFreR MCMAHoN 141-53 (1988); see
also Henriques, supra note 9, at 6. The preparatory 'materials available to arbitrators
underscore the SEC's concern, especially with regard to an arbitrator's ability to deal with
complex disputes in which difficult and complex statutes are at issue. See, e.g., The
Arbitrator's Manual (prepared by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration) re-
printed in SEcurms ARBTRATION 1989 at 477-90 (P.L.I. 1989) [hereinafter Arbitrator's
Manual]; Guidelines for Expediting Larger, Complex Commercial-Arbitrations (prepared by
the American Arbitration Association) reprinted in Arbitrator's Manual, at 807-11; see also
Poppleton, The Arbitrator's Role in Expediting the Large and Complex Commercial Case,
36 ARB. J. 1, 6 (Dec. 1981); Barrett, Arbitration of a Complex Commercial Case: Practical
Guidelines for Arbitrators and Counsel; 41 Ann. J. 1, 15 (Dec. 1986). The securities industry
also recently acknowledged the problem, calling for a larger pool of trained and knowl-
edgeable arbitrators to handle complex cases. See SIA Calls for Single Agency to Admnister
Arbitration System, 22 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 13-14 (January 5, 1990).
11 Release No. 26,805, supra note 9, at 80,110 n.46. In subsequent remarks to re-
porters, staff members of the SEC emphasized that further arbitration reform is needed in
the areas of complex litigation and class actions. See SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries,
supra note 53, at 684. The securities industry, independent of the SEC, is taking steps in
this direction. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
19 See Katsons, supra note 4, at 382-83. The disadvantages of written opinions by
laymen include the following: (i) opinions would, or should, not constitute binding prece-
dent, (ii) opinions might not be tightly reasoned or set forth well-expressed legal analysis,
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involvement in arbitrations, to ensure that parties' substantive rights
under a variety of complex laws are fully protected. In any event,
a broader standard for judicial review of awards made under such
laws does not require a judge-like, scholarly decision. 6w
B. Ensuring that Absolute Defenses To Suit Are Upheld
In the civil litigation system, there are well established proce-
dures for avoiding a trial if one party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law and there are no genuine factual disputes with
respect to the application of that law 61 In contrast, there are no
procedural methods for the hearing and resolution of dispositive
legal issues (e.g., discharge in bankruptcy, res judicata, statute of
limitations) in the arbitration process. Thus, even where there is
such a dispositive defense, a party's sole remedy is to argue the
applicability of the defense to the arbitrators, with little or no hope
that a court will be in a position to ensure that the defense is
honored.
The statute of limitations is a paradigm of this problem. The
securities industry's self-regulatory organizations have a general
six-year rule, without regard to the substantive nature of the claim. 62
However, the states usually have varying statutory periods for
different substantive claims, 63 and many federal statutes have their
(iii) the extra work might discourage potential arbitrators from serving, and (iv) the writing
of opimons would further slow down the rendering of awards. Id. Nonetheless, even Katsons
stated that "awards should clearly state the result, e.g., if it includes relief for punitive
damages or a RICO claim, it should state this separately." Id. at 383. Even this minimal
type of award form, however, is not strictly required by the new procedures mandated by
the SEC. See supra note 9.
60 See supra note 42.
61 Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move to dismiss
on the ground that there is a failure to state a claim upon which legal relief can be granted.
FED. R. Civ P 12(b)(6). Should there be any need to look beyond the pleadings themselves,
such a motion can be amended under FED. R. Civ P 56. Rule 56, which provides that
summary judgment should be entered when "pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tones, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any matenal fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, in three recent cases, has strongly
endorsed such dispositive motions in complex litigation. See Stewart, Rulings Make Sum-
mary Judgment Possible in Complex Litigation, NATL. L-J., Dec. 1, 1989, at 22.
62 NYSE Rules 603, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2603, at 4313 (Feb. 1989); AMEX
Arbitration Rule 605(a); NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 15.
63 See, e.g., N.Y Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 213 (McKinney 1989) (six-year statute for
contract claims); id. at § 214 (three-year statute for tort claims); id. at § 215 (one-year
statute for defamation claims).
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own specific limitations periods. 64 Thus, should a substantive claim
that is governed by a limitation period shorter than six years be
asserted in arbitration, the arbitrators must address a complicated
situation.
If the arbitration is governed by New York law, then the
defending party is in luck because New York has a statute permit-
ting a party to go to court at the outset to bar the action "if the
claim sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by limitation
of time had it been asserted in a court of the. state. ' 65 Failure to
seek court dismissal does not bar a party from asserting the statute
of limitations at the arbitration; 66 however, at that point the deci-
sion to apply the statute of limitations rests within the arbitrators'
sole discretion, and that discretion is, for all practical purposes,
unchallengeable. 67
The New York statute regrettably appears to be umque, both
as to procedure and as to the specific dispositive legal issues on
which a party may seek to bar an arbitration from taking place. 68
1, See, e.g., In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en
banc), cert. denied sub. nom, Vitiello v. I. Kahlowsky & Co., 488 U.S. 984 (1988) (claim
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 barred if not brought within one year
from the time of discovery and within three years from the time the violations occurred).
Unfortunately, the limitation period for § 10(b) claims is not uniform among the states, or
the federal circuit courts. See H. BLOOMENrHAL, EMERGING TRENDs iN SEculRars LAws §§
6.01-.14 (1989). Although the SEC urged the Supreme Court to set a uniform five-year
limitation on such claims, see SEC Says its FEA Limitations Period Should Be Applied to
Rule 10b-5 Claims, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 875 (June 16, 1989), the Court has thus far
refused to do so. See High Court Declines to Review Ruling on Limitations Period for '34
Act, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 935 (June 30, 1989).
61 N.Y. Civ. Piuc. L. & R. § 7502(b) (McKinney 1989), All other affirmative defenses
that are more fact specific are left to the arbitrators. See Apuzzo v. County of Ulster, 479
N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y. 1984) (laches); cf. Corbo v. Les Chateau Assoc., 511 N.Y.S.2d 883
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (factual issues concerrnng statute of limitations were so intermeshed
with the ultimate substantive issues governed by arbitration clause that court held arbitrator
must make determination).
In Re Guetta, 510 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). If the issue is not
raised at that stage, however, it is deemed to be waived and cannot be asserted later when
challenging the arbitration award. See Tilbury Fabrics, Inc. v. Stillwater, Inc., 450 N.Y.S.2d
478 (N.Y. 1982).
See In re Guetta, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
" It is unclear why only the statute of limitations defense may be used in court to
bar an arbitration. The legislature could have selected other affirmative defenses. Courts
are now called on at the outset of arbitrations to decide key matters. For example, 12(b)(6)
motions are frequently used to compel claims into arbitration. See supra note 7. One defense
where this type of judicial intervention would make sense is collateral estoppel. It is well
established that an arbitration award may be used to invoke the doctrine of collateral
estoppel on a Rule 56 summary judgment motion to bar relitigation of the same issue in a
court. See, e.g., Pallante v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 1985 WL 1360 (S.D.N.Y.
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The far more common situation finds a party in arbitration at-
tempting to assert a dispositive defense, like the statute of limita-
tions, for the first time. A recent decision of the Fourth Circuit,
Miller v Prudential Bache Securities, Inc.,69 is illustrative of this
situation, and parallels the Bobker decision in analysis and out-
come.
In Miller, more than five and one half years after losing over
one million dollars as a result of trading in naked options, Miller
fied an arbitration claim against her brokerage firm, Prudential
Bache. At the hearing, the defendant moved to dismiss the claims
on the ground that they were barred by the Maryland three-year
statute of limitations. The arbitrators, rather than applying the
NASD's six-year limitations period, "apparently" looked to the
pre-dispute choice of law provision, which stated that New York
law applied. 70 They applied New York's "borrowing statute" to
determine that the Maryland statute of limitations barred the claim. 7'
Miller subsequently sought to vacate the award in the District Court
of Maryland, but that court ruled that the arbitrators' decision was
not subject to judicial review
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Miller made alternative ar-
guments, contending that the panel had either,
(i) nusinterpreted the customer agreement by holding that the
choice of law provision (providing for New York substantive law
to be applied) incorporated New York's borrowing statute (which
is procedural),
(ii) misapplied New York's borrowing statute, or
1985) (attorneys' fees granted to party defending against claim already decided in arbitra-
tion). There is no policy reason for not allowing the converse: permit a party to an
arbitration to invoke collateral estoppel in court to bar the arbitration of a claim already
arbitrated or litigated in court. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoDr) OF JUDGMENTs § 84 (1982).
884 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 985 (June 29,
1990).
70 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the arbitrators had "apparently" followed this
line of reasoning, since "their decision did not specifically say so." Miller v. Prudential
Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128.
11 The New York borrowing statute applies in situations where a plaintiff is a non-
resident of New York and the cause of action accrued outside of New York. The statute
provides,
an action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be
commenced after the expgation of the time limited by the laws of either the
state or the place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except
that where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the
time limited by the laws of the state shall apply.
N.Y. Crv. PPAc. L. & R. § 202 (McKinney 1989).
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(iii) misinterpreted and/or misapplied the six year statute of
limitations provisions governing NASD proceedings. 72
Consistent with the Second Circuit's reasomng in Bobker,73 the
court refused to overturn the arbitration award, even though mis-
interpretations, misapplications and errors of law were evident. 74
Thus, although the dispositive defense was applied by the arbitra-
tors, the acknowledged error of its application was unreviewable.
C. The Prevention of Impermissible Damage Recoveries
Generally, disputed damage awards made by arbitrators are
governed by the "manifest disregard of the law" standard. 75 Thus,
an arbitration award unaccompanied by a written opimon is dif-
ficult to challenge in court.7 6 Nonetheless, there are two specific
damage claims for which judicial review is clearly warranted-
punitive damages and attorney's fees.
A controversial issue in arbitration is the recoverability of
pumitive damages.7 7 At one time, a plaintiff could not recover
punitive damages in arbitration,7 because such damages were dis-
allowed in .civil litigation under the federal securities laws. 79 This
may no longer be the case.
- Miller, 884 F.2d 128.
71 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
74' Miller, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 93,579-80. Of the three
arguments pressed by Miller, it is likely that the second would not have prevailed under
current case law, even had there been judicial review of the award. See McMahan & Co.
v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 727 F Supp. 833 (S.D.N1Y. 1989) (investor's
fraud claims under the 1934 Act were barred under Connecticut's two year statute of
limitations; court applied New York's borrowing statute because investor's residence was
in, and the loss occurred m, Connecticut).
71 See, e.g., Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf Oil Co., 751 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir.
1985) ("[a]rbitrators may render a lump sum award without disclosing their rationale for
it").
76 See, e.g., Sargent v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (arbitration award will not be remanded for explanation absent evidence of error
justifying vacation of the award).
77 Compare Note, An Argument Against the Availability of Punitive Damages in
Commercial Arbitration, 62 ST. Jon's L. REv 270 (1988) with Note, Punitive Damages
in Securities Arbitration: The Unresolved Question of Pendent State Claims, 37 CATm. U.
L. Rnv. 1113 (1988). See also Report on Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitrations,
New York State Bar Association (1989) (committee issuing report evenly divided on per-
mitting arbitrators to award punitive damages).
73 See Smiley, Stockbroker-Customer Disputes: Making a Case for Arbitration, 23
GA. ST. B.J. 195, 199 (1987).
79 See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1986) (punitive damages not
recoverable under § 10(b) of 1934 Securities Exchange Act); Hill York Corp. v. American
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Nowhere is this uncertainty more evident than in New York.
Fifteen years ago the state's highest court, in Garrity v Lyle Stuart,
Inc. ,° ruled that public policy forbids private pumshment and that
under no circumstances could an arbitrator award punitive dam-
ages. Dutifully applying that clear statement of New York law,
Chief Judge Motley of the Southern District of New York subse-
quently determined that such damages were not available in arbi-
tration.8 1 Nevertheless, two years later Judge Cannella refused to
apply Garrity In Duggal Int'l, Inc. v Sallmetall, B. V. ,82 Judge
Cannella ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act, not state law,
applied and that there was no public policy expressed in that statute
against punitive damages.8 3 The only other possible bar to recovery
the judge envisaged was an express or implied contractual limitation
on the power of the arbitrator to award pumtive damages, 84 and
because there was none in that case, he held that the arbitrator
had the authority to grant such a recovery.
Courts nationwide have gone both ways: some apply the ap-
propriate state law, 85 and some look to the federal arbitration
Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971) (punitive damages not recoverable under
1933 Securities Act); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (punitive damages not recoverable under 1933 Securities
Act); see generally 5C A. JAcoBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTCE UNDER RUn 103-5 § 260.03[e]
(2d ed. 1986).
- 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. 1976). Underlying the Court of Appeals' ruling was a
stated concern about the lack of judicial oversight of arbitration awards. See id. at 834 (if
punitive damages were to be available, arbitration "would become a trap for the unwary
given the freedom from judicial overview of law and facts. It would mean that the
scope of determination by arbitrators, by the license to award punitive damages, would be
both unpredictable and uncontrollable.").
s O'Dnscoll v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 0616
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1984) (available at 1984 WL 1196).
2 No. 84 Civ. 7170, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1986).
83 Duggal Int'l., Inc. v. Sallmetall, B.V., No. 84 Civ. 7170, slip op. at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 8, 1986); see also infra note 88 and accompanying text.
I" Duggal, No. 84 Civ. 7170, slip op. at 4. Courts in the Southern District of New
York continue to be divided on this issue. Compare Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman,
No. 90 Civ. 1792 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1990) (Duggal decision not followed; deemed incon-
sistent with the law), with Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F Supp. 151
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Fahnestock not followed; Duggal decision considered applicable prece-
dent).
8 See, e.g., Appel v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 628 F Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(request for punitive damages, although not awardable in arbitration, does not prevent
arbitration); Shahmirzadi v. Smith Barney, Hams Upham & Co., 636 F Supp. 49 (D.D.C.
1985) (arbitration clause governed by New York law, which does not allow recovery of
punitive damages); Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F Supp. 535
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (contractual waiver of punitive damage recovery because it was stipulated
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statute. 6 To further confuse the issue, there have been two recent
developments. First, the procedures approved by the SEC preclude
pre-dispute arbitration agreements that attempt to lirmt the power
of arbitrators to make awards.87 Second, a decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court undermined those cases holding that federal law is
applicable where a contractual arrangement dictates otherwise. 8
Given the above developments and the enormous monetary
risks posed by punitive damages, 9 the jurisdiction in which an
arbitration takes place and/or the choice of law provisions agreed
to by the parties take on great significance, as does the arbitration
panel's ability to sort through the laws' status as it now exists.
Presently, securities arbitrators are informed-without regard to
that New York law governed); Baker v. Sadick, 208 Cal.-Rptr. 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice claim under California law authorized arbitra-
tor's award of punitive damages); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. DeFluiter, 456
N.E. 429 (Ind. 1983) (punitive damages not recoverable in arbitration proceeding under
Indiana law); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assoc., 698 P.2d 880 (N.M. 1985) (punitive damages not
recoverable under contract).
See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (l1th Cir. 1988)
(arbitrators have power to award punitive damages evefi though the parties' contract
specified that New York law would be applied); Singer v. E. F Hutton & Co., 699 F
Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (federal law favonng arbitration applied even though contract
stated that New York law applied); Willis v. Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc., 569 F
Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (even though New York law governed, demand for punitive
damages did not make arbitration improper).
81 See, e.g., NYSE Rules 637(4), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2637, at 4325 (Feb. 1989)
("No agreement shall include any condition which limits the ability of the arbitrators
to make any award.").
u Although the Court ruled in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), that
the federal substantive arbitration law pre-empts state arbitration law-tis was Judge
Cannella's basis in Duggal for not looking to New York law-the Court more recently held
in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989), that
state law controls where, under contract, there is a choice of law clause specifying that a
state's law should apply, and the Federal Arbitration Act is silent on the substantive matter
at issue.
"Although the Supreme Court recently held that the eighth amendment does not
apply to punitive damage awards, it specifically reserved decision on the question of whether
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment bar such awards. Browing-
Ferns, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). A district court recently
applied this rationale in a massive tort case. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F Supp.
1053 (D.N.J. 1989), vacated, 718 F Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989). This term the Court will
decide that issue. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990) (No. 1279, 1989 Term, argued October 3, 1990). Literature
debating the constitutionality of such damage recoveries is voluminous. See, e.g., Fein,&
Reynolds, High Court May End Judicial Sweepstakes, MANHrrmAN LAW., June 1990, at
26; Grags, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HAsTTros CONsT. L.Q. 241
(1985); Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv
139 (1986).
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jurisdiction-that they "can consider punitive damages" 9 and are
further instructed that, if punitive damages are awarded, the de-
cision of the arbitrators should clearly specify what portion of the
award is intended as punitive damages, and the arbitrators should
consider referring to the authority upon which they relied. 9' Un-
fortunately, those directives are neither consistent with the status
of the law, nor sufficient to ensure that an aggrieved party will
receive judicial review of a big dollar mistake, under the "manifest
disregard" standard. 92
The recovery of attorneys' fees also is a form of damages
frequently sought by arbitration claimants. This is not surprising
when one considers that the directives given to arbitrators regarding
attorney's fees are very similar to the directives govermng punitive
damages. 93 And yet the law in virtually every state, barring explicit
agreement by the parties, prohibits recovery of attorneys' fees.94
"Arbitrator's Manual, supra note 57, at 487.
9, Id. The new award form put in use by the NYSE prominently displays areas for
punitve damage recovenes. See Selected Summary Award Statements, supra note 41, at 999-
1003.
, The Arbitration Director of the New York Stock Exchange has written that he is
"unaware of any securities arbitration award that has been vacated because arbitrators
awarded punitive damages." Moms, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration, 21 SEc.
& CoM. REG., Sept. 21, 1988, at 167, 168. From May of 1989 to May of 1990, arbitrators
granted 21 punitive damage awards totaling $4.5 million; for the pnor one year period,
there were ine awards totaling $1.7 million. See Siconolfi, Blow to Brokers: Stock Investors
Win More Punitive Damage Awards in Arbitration Cases, Wall St. J., June I1, 1990, at
Al, col. 1.
91 Arbitrator's Manual, supra note 57, at 487.
Generally, parties to an arbitration are responsible for their personal costs
associated with bringing or defending an arbitration action. Exceptions to that
rule do exist. For instance, if there is an agreement that provides for an award
of attorneys' fees, it is within the discretion of the panel to do so. Parties
should be prepared to argue the statutory or contractual basis that permits
the award of attorneys' fees. The arbitrators should consider referring to the
authority relied upon if attorneys' fees are awarded.
Id. Furthermore, the new award form used by the NYSE prominently displays areas of
attorneys' fees recoveries. See Selected Summary Award Statements, supra note 41, at 999-
1003.
" See M. DoMic, DomKE ON COMMERCIAL AnarrEATION § 43.01 (rev. ed. 1987). For
a sampling of states that follow this practice, see Cueras v. Potamkin Dodge, Inc., 455 So.
2d 398 (Fla. 1984) (attorney's fees allowed where expressly agreed to in contract); Bingham
County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 665 P.2d 1046 (Idaho 1983) (absent contractual
agreement to award attorney's fees, an arbitrator may not do so); School Comm. v. Dever,
395 N.E.2d 900 (Mass. 1979) (recovery of attorney's fees not allowed absent express
agreement to the contrary). Michigan is one of the few states that allows an arbitrator to
award attorneys' fees even if the parties' arbitration agreement did not provide for such a
recovery. See J. R. Synder Co. v. Soble, 226 N.W.2d 276 (Mich. 1975).
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New York is illustrative. According to New York statutory5
and case96 law, attorneys fees are not recoverable in an arbitration
absent an express agreement to the contrary 97 Notwithstanding this
well-articulated law, courts reviewing attorneys' fees awards have
not utilized the "manifest disregard" standard; rather they have
either looked to whether the arbitrators exceeded their power, 9 or
whether the matter was properly before the arbitrators in the first
place. 99 Courts outside of New York, whose states have similar
statutes, also seem to share this reluctance to employ the "manifest
disregard" standard on attorneys' fees claims.10° The reason for
the judicial reluctance is not clear; this is clearly one money damage
claim for wich judicial review-by whatever standard-is appro-
priate.
CONCLUSION
As arbitration has become more and more the mandated forum
for the resolution of civil. disputes, so too it has come to resemble
the civil litigation system it was designed to replace. The only area
that seems not to have kept pace is the right to seek review of
" N.Y. Cir. PRAc. L. & R. § 7513 (McKinney 1989).
16 E.g., Arthur Richards, Ltd. v. Brampton Textiles, Ltd., 399 N.Y.S.2d 111, 112
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977) ("Since it is not indicated on this record that the agreement contains
such provision for attorneys' fees, that claim may not be submitted to arbitration.");
Geneseo Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Village of Geneseo, 458 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1982), aff'd, 463 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983) ("Inasmuch as the arbitration agreement made
no provision for attorneys' fees, the arbitrator properly demed petitioner's application.");
Grossman v. Laurence Handpnnts-N.J., Inc., 455 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
("attorneys' fees are specifically excluded, unless they are expressly provided for in the
arbitration agreement") (citation omitted); see also 8 WEINsTEiN, KORN, MILLER, NEw YoRx
CIVi PRACTICE § 7513.02, at 75-303 (1988) ("The parties may, if they wish, provide for
the reasonable payment of attorney's fees by the losing party. In the absence of an
agreement, CPLR 7513 provides that such fees would not be included as expenses."
(citations omitted)).
9 Brockport v. County of Monroe Pure Water Div., 429 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 442 N.Y.2d 510 (1981) ("Simply stated, arbitration as a contractually
selected remedy cannot be ordered absent an express, direct and unequivocal agreement in
writing between the parties.").
" See, e.g., Transvenezuelan Shipping Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., No. 81-4987,
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1981) (holding that "the scope of [the arbitrators'] authority is
an issue subject to judicial review" under the FAA, and that the arbitrators had exceeded
their authority under 9 U.S.C. § 10 where there was no agreement to provide for attorneys'
fees).
" Sammi Line Co. v. Altamar Navegacion S.A., 605 F Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(arbitrators had no authority to award attorneys' fees where there was no showing that
such an award was within the scope of arbitrable issues).
' See, e.g., supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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arbitration awards; there, it remains very difficult to overturn an
award, even where it can be shown that the arbitrators have com-
pletely nusinterpreted the applicable law This state of affairs be-
comes exceedingly problematic when the resolution of complicated
statutory rights and the power to award huge sums of money is
placed in the hands of poorly trained arbitrators. Although the
SEC has belatedly acknowledged that there is a need for further
reform in arbitration procedure, what is needed is prompt recog-
nition that, if arbitrators are expected to make decisions in which
complicated legal matters are at issue, those decisions must be
judicially reviewable.
